I have a habit of wanting to discuss topics in detail then not following through (only for lack of time). So, to encourage/remind myself, I've titled this "Part 1" and created a new category specifically for the topic. I hope it works.
Earlier this week I directed readers to the Arab Spring discussion at Political Animal. Kevin Drum has posted a summary of the discussion between Dan Drezner and Marc Lynch. As broad a topic as the Arab Spring is, the debate this week addressed the closely related but broader topic: Democracy promotion in general. While points to consider were made in each of the 15 posts, the last four go to the heart of matters.
Marc: Dan is wrong: there were plenty of other options besides war for promoting democracy in the Middle East.
Kevin: You know, maybe the war caused the recent oubreaks of democracy, maybe it didn't. But it is affecting the way they evolve. Is anyone thinking hard about that?
Marc: What do we do if radical anti-American Islamists win free and fair elections?
Dan: If the radicals win, let 'em give governing a try. Things will probably turn out OK.
Kevin's two sentence synopsis of Dan's final post reveals my basic grievance with the hyper-idealism of neoconservative militancy. If the radicals win (elections), it's likely going to work out in the end anyway. At what cost though, Dan? To put my question in context, Dan's closing thoughts:
As I said a few years ago when Fareed Zakaria's The Future of Freedom came out, there will always be a period of instability when there is regime change:
It's more a question of timing — illiberal states that become democratic are more likely to have problems sooner rather than later, while authoritarian states that are slowly democratizing are likely to have problems later rather than sooner.
In the end, there are two factors that lead me to believe that this concern is overblown.
First, many authoritarians consciously manipulate the prominence of their radical opponents in order to appear indispensible. In the case of Pakistan, for example, one reason Musharraf's religious opponents seem so powerful is that Musharraf banned prominent secular parties from contesting elections, thereby channeling opposition to his regime towards the religious parties. The Saudi royal family could have engineered different results in their recent elections had they allowed women the right to vote. During the Cold War, strongmen afraid of the rise of left parties encouraged the rise of Islamic parties as a domestic counterweight.
My point is not that parties like Hamas don't have genuine support. However, sometimes this support is hyped by the very governments they oppose.
Second, it's worth remembering that radical Islamic movements that have come to power have proven to be really, really bad at governing. The Iranian clerics are not terribly popular with the young people; the Taliban were loathed by a majority of the Afghan populace; and the only other radical Islamic regime was Sudan. This is not a stellar record of governance. The best way to tame radical Islamic movements may be to give them a hand in government and let them realize how difficult it is to make the trains run on time.
The example of Iran also offers a warning — that a radical group can seize power with popular support and then maintain that power by any means necessary. However, that possibility is present regardless of whether the U.S. pushes for democracy in the region or not (it wasn't like the mullahs came to power in Iran because the Shah was democratizing in the late seventies). Better to make the good faith effort than not.
If there exists a quantifiable method for determining the results of foreign policy, I haven't seen it. The accurate observations he makes don't determine the necessity of forced democracy and greater western intervention in the region. Any number of Mideast scholars conclude western intervention is a primary cause of the belligerance. I'll grant that support for Hamas and other radical groups is hyped to an extent. But I'm not convinced that our adventure abroad has reduced that support, and I think there's growing evidence that we've validated the complaints and fostered extremism. "The radicals win," will fail when trying to govern, and all should work out from there. That is a shamefully risky proposition that includes ousting the radicals (probably by force) after whatever unfortunate events lead to failure.
Any policy that validates extremists should be discounted on principle. If the policy has the possibility of empowering extremists, then what's the point of the policy to begin with? Democracy at all costs? I'm fine with promoting democracy, it just seems absurd to piss off the rabble prior to elections. Much is being made of the notion that "no liberal democracy has ever declared war on another." That's a bit of statistical spin and will be the topic of part 2.
-- Zap
Who was it who first said "No democracy has ever declared war on another"? I have read it several times and would like to cite its source to use the quote as factual evidence for a paper but i have no idea where to find the original citation.
Posted by: annika sage | October 30, 2005 at 22:49